The Chernobyl Disaster
A reactor exploded in Soviet Ukraine, and the world learned about it from a Swedish shoe scanner
Open
On the morning of the twenty eighth of April, nineteen eighty six, a routine radiation monitor at a nuclear plant in Sweden went off as a worker walked in from outside.
They checked their own reactor first, and found nothing wrong with it. Then they worked out that the contamination was on his shoes, that it had come in from the air, and that the wind that morning was coming from the southeast.
That is how the world found out. Two days after the explosion, from a shoe, in a different country.
Scene 1Twenty three minutes past one
One twenty three and forty seconds in the morning. Reactor number four at the Chernobyl plant in Soviet Ukraine.
The operators are running a safety test. It is a rehearsal for a blackout: they want to know whether the spinning turbine can power the cooling pumps in the seconds before the diesel generators start.
The test has already been delayed for hours, and has been handed to a night shift that did not plan it and did not expect to run it.
They press the button marked A Z five. It is the emergency shutdown. It drives every control rod into the core at once, and it is the thing you press when you want the reaction to stop.
Because of how the rods were built, with graphite on their tips, the first thing they did on the way in was displace water and briefly increase the reaction rather than stop it.
Within seconds the core was at more than a hundred times its rated power.
Scene 2The roof
Two explosions lifted the upper shield of the reactor, a disc of steel and concrete weighing a thousand tonnes, and dropped it back at an angle. The reactor hall was open to the sky.
Burning graphite from the core was thrown across the site and onto the roof of the neighbouring reactor building.
Firefighters arrived five minutes later. They had no protective clothing, no dosimeters worth the name, and no reason to believe this was anything other than a fire.
They scraped glowing chunks of reactor graphite off the roof with their boots. Some described a metallic taste. Several of them were dead within weeks.
Scene 3Thirty six hours
Three kilometres away was Pripyat: a city of forty nine thousand people, built in nineteen seventy to house the plant's workers. The average age was twenty six.
On the morning of the twenty sixth, children went to school. People fished on the cooling channel. There were weddings that afternoon.
Above them an open reactor core was burning in the air.
The evacuation came on the afternoon of the twenty seventh, roughly thirty six hours after the explosion. Twelve hundred buses came from Kyiv. Residents were told to bring documents and enough for three days.
They were never allowed back. The city is still there, and still empty.
That is the entire announcement. Two and a half days, four sentences, no evacuation notice, and no mention that the fire was still burning.
Scene 4The liquidators
Roughly six hundred thousand people were eventually sent into the zone to clean it. They were called liquidators.
On the most contaminated section of roof, robots failed. The radiation destroyed their electronics. So men were sent instead, in lead aprons, running out to shovel graphite for ninety seconds at a time before running back.
Many were conscripts. Many were never told their real dose.
What most of them received afterwards was a certificate confirming they had been there.
Five accounts
Chernobyl is not really disputed as a sequence of events. What is disputed is who it belongs to, and how many people it killed.
victorSoviet State / Official Containment
The Soviet state
The first account is the official one, and its logic is that this was a secret before it was an emergency.
Classification governed the response. Radiation figures released domestically were a fraction of the measured values. Evacuation was delayed while the decision went up the chain and back.
And when an explanation was finally required, it was operator error: the men in the control room had broken procedure. This had the advantage of protecting the reactor design, and the entire Soviet nuclear programme built on it.
Read the full account
Narrative
The Soviet state's first instinct was not rescue but control of information. Within hours of the explosion, the local KGB and party officials in Pripyat knew a reactor had been destroyed. The information moved up the chain to Moscow, where a government commission under Deputy Chairman Boris Shcherbina was dispatched by the evening of April 26. But the public, in Pripyat and beyond, was told nothing. The classified regime that governed all nuclear matters, civilian and military alike, treated the accident as a state secret before it treated it as an emergency.
The official position hardened around minimization. Radiation readings released to the domestic press were reported at 1 percent or less of the levels authorities actually measured. Kyiv held its May Day parade on May 1, 1986, five days after the explosion, with children marching under a plume that had already been detected across Scandinavia. The decision came from the top of the Ukrainian party apparatus, which feared that canceling the parade would signal panic and admit the scale of the failure. Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, the Ukrainian party leader, is reported to have been told by Moscow that canceling would cost him his post.
The state's account, delivered by Valery Legasov to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in August 1986, placed the blame squarely on the operators. The five-day test procedure had been mishandled: the crew had disabled safety systems, run the reactor at dangerously low power, and violated the operating rules. This framing served two purposes. It protected the RBMK reactor design, which was in use across the Soviet nuclear fleet and could not be admitted as flawed without indicting the entire program. And it located responsibility in individual human error rather than in the system that had built the reactor, trained the crew, and written the rules. The 1987 trial convicted plant director Viktor Bryukhanov, chief engineer Nikolai Fomin, and deputy chief engineer Anatoly Dyatlov, each sentenced to 10 years. The reactor's designers were not in the dock.
The containment effort itself was genuinely massive and, on its own terms, effective. The government commission organized the helicopter drops that smothered the core, the tunneling beneath the reactor to prevent a molten breach into the groundwater, and the construction of the sarcophagus in 206 days under lethal conditions. The Soviet state framed the liquidators as heroes of a socialist mobilization, which in the physical sense they were. What the official narrative would not concede, until glasnost forced the question open, was that the same state that mobilized 600,000 people to contain the disaster had for two days concealed it from the people living closest to it.
Arguments
- The accident was a state secret before it was an emergency; classification governed the response
- Blame was assigned to operator error to protect the RBMK design and the wider nuclear program
- Domestic radiation figures were released at a fraction of measured levels to prevent panic
- The containment mobilization of 600,000 was real and, in engineering terms, succeeded
Sources
- The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 (INSAG-7)
- Top Secret Chernobyl: The Nuclear Disaster through the Eyes of the Soviet Politburo, KGB, and U.S. Intelligence
- Chernobyl: History of a Tragedy
vanquishedLiquidators and Evacuees
The liquidators and the evacuated
The second account rejects the arithmetic entirely.
Its argument is that a death toll is the wrong instrument: that people were kept in their ordinary routines for thirty six hours under an open radiological fire, that men worked in shifts measured in seconds without being told what they were absorbing, and that what happened to them is individual rather than statistical.
One liquidator's testimony puts the compensation in proportion.
Read the full account
Narrative
The people who paid for the disaster in their bodies were told the least about it. In Pripyat, life continued normally through April 26. Children walked to school past a reactor that was on fire behind a treeline. Residents later recalled a strange metallic taste in the air and a fine ash. Some stood on a railway bridge, since remembered as the "Bridge of Death," to watch the colored glow over the plant; local lore holds that many who watched later sickened. When the evacuation order came on the afternoon of April 27, people were told to take documents and food for three days. They locked their doors, left pets behind, and boarded buses. The three days became forever.
The liquidators came next, roughly 600,000 of them over the following years, drawn from the army, the mines, the fire service, and ordinary civilian call-ups. They worked in shifts measured not in hours but in minutes on the most radioactive ground, because a longer shift would be a death sentence. Soldiers known as "bio-robots" ran onto the reactor roof to shovel graphite for 40 to 90 seconds each, after remote-controlled machines failed in the radiation. Miners dug a tunnel beneath the reactor in heat that made protective gear unbearable, many of them working naked. They were promised bonuses, certificates, and later a modest liquidator's pension. Many did not know, at the time, the doses they were absorbing.
Svetlana Alexievich spent years collecting their testimony for Voices from Chernobyl, the oral history that helped win her the Nobel Prize. The book opens with Lyudmilla Ignatenko, wife of the Pripyat firefighter Vasily Ignatenko, one of the first men to the roof. She followed him to the Moscow hospital where the acutely irradiated were dying, defied the rule that pregnant women stay away, and sat with him as his body broke down. He died on May 13. Their daughter, born after his death, lived four hours; doctors told Lyudmilla the infant had absorbed the radiation that would otherwise have killed the mother. Alexievich's subjects describe a specific kind of abandonment: not only the radiation, but the official silence that surrounded it, the vanished villages, the neighbors who would not touch them for fear of contamination, the sense of having been used and then filed away.
The evacuees became a permanent category of displacement. Somewhere between 115,000 and 350,000 people were relocated from the contaminated zones of Ukraine and Belarus. Belarus, downwind, absorbed roughly 70 percent of the fallout though the reactor stood in Ukraine; hundreds of Belarusian villages were bulldozed and buried. The "samosely," mostly elderly returnees, drifted back into the exclusion zone to die in their own homes rather than in resettlement blocks. For the liquidators and evacuees, Chernobyl is not a policy debate about statistical deaths. It is a set of specific rooms, specific graves, and specific bodies that the state counted late, if at all.
Arguments
- Residents were kept in normal routines under an open-air radiological fire for 36 hours
- Liquidators worked in shifts of seconds and minutes; many did not know their true doses
- The human cost is individual and testimonial, not captured by official death counts
- Belarus absorbed ~70% of the fallout though the reactor stood in Ukraine
Sources
- Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster
- Chernobyl Prayer (Voices from Chernobyl), Nobel Prize in Literature citation
- Manual for Survival: A Chernobyl Guide to the Future
academicScientific / Epidemiological Dispute
The epidemiologists
The third account is a genuine scientific disagreement, and the gap in it is enormous.
The confirmed immediate deaths number about thirty one. The World Health Organisation's Chernobyl Forum projected up to four thousand among the most exposed. Modelled European studies produce figures between sixteen and sixty thousand. Greenpeace published ninety three thousand and above.
The clearly attributable population effect is thyroid cancer in children exposed to contaminated milk: more than six thousand cases.
The disagreement is about method. Applying a linear model of low dose risk across millions of lightly exposed people generates very large numbers from very small individual risks, and whether that is legitimate is itself contested.
The counter argument is about what invisibility is used for.
Read the full account
Narrative
How many people did Chernobyl kill? The honest answer is that the number depends on the method, and the methods disagree by a factor of a hundred. This is not a fringe uncertainty. It is the central scientific controversy of the disaster, and it turns on how one counts deaths that are statistically real but individually invisible.
The floor is firm. Thirty-one deaths were officially attributed to the accident in the immediate aftermath, most of them plant workers and firefighters who died of acute radiation syndrome within weeks; later Soviet and Ukrainian accounting raised the acute-phase figure somewhat. These deaths are documented, named, and beyond dispute. Above that floor, everything is modeled. The 2005 Chernobyl Forum, a consensus body of the IAEA, WHO, UNDP, and the three affected states, projected that radiation might eventually cause up to about 4,000 additional cancer deaths among the roughly 600,000 most exposed liquidators, evacuees, and residents, with a further several thousand possible among the tens of millions exposed to lower doses. The Forum stressed that these cancers would be lost in the statistical noise of normal cancer rates and might never be individually confirmable.
The one unambiguous population health effect is thyroid cancer. Radioactive iodine, concentrated in milk from contaminated pasture and taken up by growing children's thyroids, produced more than 6,000 excess thyroid cancer cases in people exposed as children in Ukraine, Belarus, and western Russia. Because thyroid cancer is highly survivable when treated, the associated death toll from it is small, on the order of 15 confirmed by UNSCEAR, but the disease burden and the surgeries are real and traceable directly to the fallout.
Then the estimates fan out. The 2006 TORCH report, commissioned by European Greens and written by Ian Fairlie and David Sumner, projected 30,000 to 60,000 excess cancer deaths across Europe by applying a linear no-threshold dose model to the whole exposed population. A 2006 Greenpeace report put the eventual cancer toll near 93,000 and total deaths far higher. The most extreme figure, roughly 985,000 deaths, came from a 2009 volume by Alexey Yablokov and colleagues published by the New York Academy of Sciences, which then issued an unusual disclaimer that it had neither commissioned nor peer-reviewed the work; mainstream radiobiologists criticized its methodology for attributing nearly all mortality changes in the region to radiation. The dispute is not only about numbers. It is about whether the linear no-threshold model, which assumes even tiny doses carry proportional risk across millions of people, is a legitimate way to count the dead, or a way to manufacture a catastrophe out of statistical extrapolation. Both the minimizers and the maximizers accuse the other of politics. The uncertainty is genuine, and it is unlikely ever to be resolved.
Arguments
- The confirmed immediate toll (~31) and the projected toll (thousands to ~93,000+) differ by orders of magnitude by method, not by fact
- Thyroid cancer (6,000+ cases in exposed children) is the one clearly attributable population effect
- The linear no-threshold model, applied to millions at low doses, drives the high estimates and is itself contested
- Both low and high estimates are accused of political motivation; the uncertainty is real
Sources
- Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts (The Chernobyl Forum 2003-2005)
- The Other Report on Chernobyl (TORCH)
- Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, UNSCEAR 2008 Report, Annex D (Chernobyl)
- Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment
academicNuclear Industry and Reactor Safety
The reactor engineers
The fourth account arrived six years late and reversed the verdict.
In nineteen ninety two, a second international report, INSAG seven, moved the blame from the operators to the design. The RBMK reactor had a positive void coefficient, meaning that as its cooling water boiled away the reaction sped up rather than slowed.
And the control rods were tipped with graphite, so the emergency shutdown briefly added power before removing it.
That flaw was known. It had appeared at another plant in nineteen eighty three. It was not corrected across the fleet, and it was not disclosed to the men who operated them.
Read the full account
Narrative
Within the nuclear engineering community, the argument about Chernobyl is not whether the operators erred, but how much the reactor itself was a trap waiting to spring. The Soviet state's 1986 account, delivered by Valery Legasov in Vienna, put the accident down to a catalogue of operator violations during a botched safety test. In 1992 the IAEA's own advisory group revisited that verdict in the report INSAG-7 and shifted the weight substantially toward the machine.
The RBMK reactor had two flaws that turned a bad test into a catastrophe. The first was a large positive void coefficient: when the cooling water in the core boiled into steam, the reactor did not slow down, it sped up. At the low power the crew had been driven into, this made the reactor dangerously unstable. The second was in the safety system itself. The control rods that were supposed to shut the reactor down had graphite tips, and when the crew hit the AZ-5 emergency button, the first thing the descending rods did was briefly displace water and add reactivity to the bottom of the core. The emergency stop, for a few seconds, was an emergency accelerator. This "positive scram" effect had been observed at the Ignalina plant in 1983 and never corrected across the RBMK fleet. The full insertion of the rods took some 18 seconds, far too slow. The crew pressed the button that was designed to save them and it detonated the core.
INSAG-7 concluded that the operators did violate procedures, but that they were operating a reactor whose most dangerous characteristics had been concealed from them, in a safety culture that prioritized output and secrecy over defense in depth. This is the industry's core lesson: Chernobyl was a systems failure, a product of design, training, regulation, and institutional secrecy interacting, not a story of uniquely reckless men. Western reactors, with negative void coefficients and containment structures the RBMK lacked, were held to be categorically safer, a line the industry had strong incentives to draw firmly.
The consequences reshaped the industry. The remaining RBMK reactors were retrofitted to reduce the void coefficient and speed the scram. Global reactor construction, already slowing after Three Mile Island in 1979, stalled further; Chernobyl became, with Fukushima in 2011, one of the two accidents that define public fear of nuclear power. That fear is itself contested. In this framing Chernobyl is a lesson about a specific flawed reactor and a specific secretive state, wrongly generalized into a verdict on an entire technology.
Arguments
- INSAG-7 (1992) shifted blame from operators toward the RBMK's design flaws
- The positive void coefficient and graphite-tipped control rods made the reactor unstable and the emergency stop briefly dangerous
- The known "positive scram" flaw was never corrected across the fleet and hidden from operators
- Pro-nuclear analysts argue the accident was wrongly generalized into fear of all nuclear power
Sources
- The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 (INSAG-7)
- Midnight in Chernobyl: The Untold Story of the World's Greatest Nuclear Disaster
- RBMK Reactors, Appendix to Nuclear Power Reactors
revisionistGlasnost and the Fall of the USSR
Glasnost and the collapse
The fifth account treats the disaster as a political event.
Gorbachev had been in office for thirteen months, promising openness. Then the state's reflex was to say nothing for two and a half days, while the fallout crossed borders and made the silence impossible to maintain.
The information monopoly did not survive it. Gorbachev himself later made the strongest version of the claim.
Read the full account
Narrative
Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power in March 1985 promising glasnost, openness, and perestroika, restructuring. In April 1986 the Soviet system met that promise with its oldest reflex: silence. The gap between what Gorbachev said the state would be and how the state actually behaved in the first days after Chernobyl is, in this reading, the moment the Soviet Union's credibility began to fail from within.
The failure was total and public. The state concealed the accident from its own citizens while the fallout was already tripping alarms in Sweden. It ran the Kyiv May Day parade under a radioactive plume. It released false radiation figures. And it could not sustain any of this, because the physical fact of the fallout had already escaped Soviet control the moment it crossed the border. Foreign monitoring, foreign broadcasts, and the sheer scale of the mobilization made the cover-up impossible to maintain. Gorbachev did not address the nation until May 14, eighteen days after the explosion. By then the damage to the state's authority was done.
Gorbachev himself drew the lesson explicitly. He wrote that Chernobyl "made absolutely clear how important it was to continue the policy of glasnost," and, more startlingly, that the disaster "even more than my launch of perestroika, was perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union." The historian Serhii Plokhy, in his prize-winning history, argues that Chernobyl exposed the structural pathologies of the Soviet system: the secrecy, the unaccountable bureaucracy, the sacrifice of safety to production targets and prestige, the treatment of citizens as expendable. Once glasnost let people say so out loud, the catastrophe became a lens through which the whole system could be criticized. Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov later put it bluntly: "It was glasnost that destroyed the Soviet Union," because "people opened their eyes."
Chernobyl also fed the national movements that pulled the union apart. In Ukraine and Belarus, the disaster became a rallying cause: proof that Moscow would poison the republics and lie about it. The Ukrainian environmental and independence movements drew directly on Chernobyl grievance. When Ukraine voted for independence in December 1991, the reactor was part of the indictment. In this perspective Chernobyl is not only a nuclear accident. It is the moment a state built on controlling information lost the ability to control it, and never recovered.
Arguments
- The disaster exposed the fatal gap between glasnost's promise and the state's reflexive secrecy
- Physical fallout crossing borders made the cover-up impossible, breaking the information monopoly
- Gorbachev himself named Chernobyl "perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union"
- Chernobyl grievance fueled the Ukrainian and Belarusian independence movements
Sources
- Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe
- Turning Point at Chernobyl
- Chernobyl: The End of the Nuclear Dream
The turn
Each account leaves out what would most complicate it.
Soviet State / Official Containment
The Soviet account leaves out the positive void coefficient, the thirty six hours, and the suppressed readings.
From the record
The RBMK reactor's positive void coefficient and flawed control-rod designThe 36-hour delay in evacuating PripyatThe suppression of true radiation readings from the affected populationThe liquidators' account leaves out that the containment they built actually worked, and that without them it would have been far worse.
From the record
The engineering necessity that drove the liquidator mobilizationThe genuine effectiveness of the containment they accomplishedStatistical and epidemiological framing of the health outcomesScientific / Epidemiological Dispute
The epidemiological account leaves out the testimonial reality that a confidence interval cannot hold, and it leaves out that the nuclear industry has an interest in the low number.
From the record
The individual testimonial reality that statistics cannot captureThe political stakes for the nuclear industry in a low numberNon-fatal health and psychological burdens of contaminationNuclear Industry and Reactor Safety
The engineers' account leaves out the people almost entirely. It is an account of a machine.
From the record
The human and testimonial cost of the disasterThe industry's own incentive to frame Western designs as categorically safeThe political and information-control dimensions of the Soviet responseGlasnost and the Fall of the USSR
And the political account leaves out everything that is not political: the health effects, the emptied towns, and the other causes of Soviet collapse that had nothing to do with a reactor.
From the record
The disaster's non-political human and epidemiological dimensionsThe many other causes of Soviet collapse (economic stagnation, Afghanistan, arms race)The genuine engineering success of the containment
Close
The reactor is now inside a steel arch, a hundred and eight metres high, moved into place in twenty sixteen. It is designed to last a hundred years, which is not the same as being finished.
Pripyat is still standing. The school, the swimming pool, the fairground with a ferris wheel that was due to open five days after the explosion and never carried a passenger.
The exclusion zone is now, by some measures, one of the more successful wildlife reserves in Europe, which tells you what the main threat to wildlife in Europe usually is.
And the world still found out from a shoe.
The record
By the numbers
- Span
- 1986
- Killed
- 31immediate, Soviet official to 4,000, WHO/IAEA projection…
- Displaced
- 115-350Kevacuated and resettled; roughly 600,000 liquidators; 5…
- Place
- Ukraine
Key figures
- Mikhail GorbachevGeneral Secretary of the Communist Party; his glasnost policy was tested and hardened by the state's failure to disclose the disaster1931 to 2022
- Valery LegasovChemist who led the Soviet delegation to the IAEA in Vienna; presented the accident report, then died by suicide on the second anniversary1936 to 1988
- Anatoly DyatlovDeputy chief engineer who supervised the fatal test; sentenced to 10 years, maintained the reactor's design was to blame1931 to 1995
- Viktor BryukhanovPlant director; convicted of gross safety violations and sentenced to 10 years' labor camp1935 to 2021
- Vasily IgnatenkoPripyat firefighter who died of acute radiation syndrome; his widow Lyudmilla's testimony opens Svetlana Alexievich's oral history1961 to 1986
- Svetlana AlexievichBelarusian writer whose Voices from Chernobyl collected survivor testimony; awarded the 2015 Nobel Prize in Literature1948 to ?
- Serhii PlokhyHarvard historian whose Chernobyl history won the 2018 Baillie Gifford Prize; argues the disaster exposed the fatal flaws of the Soviet system1957 to ?
Primary sources
· Report presented by the USSR at the IAEA Post-Accident Review Meeting, Vienna, August 1986, as quoted by a Commission of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power in INSAG-7, Annex I (IAEA, 1992), p. 60 · August 1986
“the prime cause of the accident was an extremely improbable combination of violations of instructions and operating rules committed by the staff of the unit.”
· Extraordinary Session of the CC CPSU Politburo, April 28, 1986, working copy (National Security Archive translation, document 4) · April 28, 1986
“The statement should be written in such a way that it does not cause excessive anxiety or panic.”
· CC CPSU Politburo session of July 3, 1986, as recorded in Anatoly S. Chernyaev's notes (National Security Archive translation, document 15) · July 3, 1986
“The [station] personnel are to blame for the accident; but the scale of the accident is due to the design of the reactor.”
· Letter from the science editor of Pravda to the CC CPSU about his trip to Chernobyl, May 4 to 9, 1986 (National Security Archive translation, document 12) · May 1986
“The situation with radiation in the city was clear within an hour. No planned emergency evacuation measures existed: people did not know what to do.”
· Svetlana Alexievich, Voices from Chernobyl, Children's Chorus, translated by Keith Gessen (Dalkey Archive Press, 2005), as excerpted on NobelPrize.org · 2005
“In parting they shook our hands and gave us certificates of gratitude for our self-sacrifice.”
· Chernobyl's Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts, second revised version (IAEA, April 2006), p. 15 · 2006
“It is impossible to assess reliably, with any precision, numbers of fatal cancers caused by radiation exposure due to Chernobyl accident.”
· Joint news release, Chernobyl: the true scale of the accident, Geneva · September 5, 2005
“A total of up to 4000 people could eventually die of radiation exposure from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (NPP) accident nearly 20 years ago, an international team of more than 100 scientists has concluded.”
· Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, UNSCEAR 2008 Report, Volume II, Annex D, paragraph 98 (United Nations, 2011) · 2011
“The Committee has decided not to use models to project absolute numbers of effects in populations exposed to low radiation doses from the Chernobyl accident, because of unacceptable uncertainties in the predictions.”
· INSAG-7, The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1, Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-7 (IAEA, 1992), conclusion (2), p. 23 · 1992
“The accident is now seen to have been the result of the concurrence of the following major factors: specific physical characteristics of the reactor; specific design features of the reactor control elements; and the fact that the reactor was brought to a state not specified by procedures or investigated by an independent safety body.”
· The Other Report on Chernobyl (TORCH), commissioned by Rebecca Harms MEP, Greens/EFA, executive summary, p. 11 · April 2006
“However the statement is misleading, as the figure calculated in the IAEA/WHO report is actually 9,000 fatalities.”
· The Chernobyl Catastrophe: Consequences on Human Health (Greenpeace, Amsterdam, 2006), p. 10 · April 2006
“The most recently published figures indicate that in Belarus, Russia and the Ukraine alone the accident resulted in an estimated 200,000 additional deaths between 1990 and 2004.”
· 20 years after Chornobyl Catastrophe. Future Outlook: National Report of Ukraine (Kyiv, Atika, 2006), p. 8 · 2006
“Radiation contamination maps and radiation level data were classified until 1989.”
· Nobel Lecture, Swedish Academy, Stockholm · December 7, 2015
“We, Belarusians, had become the people of Chernobyl.”
· Turning Point at Chernobyl, Project Syndicate · April 14, 2006
“Indeed, the Chernobyl catastrophe was a historic turning point: there was the era before the disaster, and there is the very different era that has followed.”
· Regarding the Accident at Reactor No. 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, urgent report to the CC CPSU Politburo (National Security Archive translation, document 2) · April 26, 1986
“On 04/26/86 at 1:21 AM during the decommissioning of energy block No. 4 of the Chernobyl NPS during planned maintenance, after the reactor had been stopped, there was an explosion in the upper part of the reactor compartment. According to the director of Chernobyl NPS the explosion caused the collapse of roofs and parts of the wall paneling of the reactor compartment, several panels of the roof in the machine hall and a unit of the auxiliary systems of the reactor compartment, and also a roof fire. At 3:30 AM the fire was extinguished. Measures are being taken by the staff to cool down the active zone of the reactor. In the opinion of the three main administrators under the USSR Ministry of Health, the adoption of special measures, including evacuating the population from the city, is unnecessary.”
Threads
- The Collapse of the Soviet UnionGorbachev promised glasnost in 1985. In April 1986 the state hid a meltdown from its own people for 36 hours. He later called Chernobyl, not perestroika, "perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union"
- The Fall of the Berlin WallAt 6:53 p.m. on November 9, 1989, a spokesman misread a memo on live television. The Wall fell by midnight.
- The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki66,000 dead in 8.5 seconds. Seven of eight five-star American generals said it wasn’t necessary.